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Preface 
Long-term energy forecasting has traditionally been a major concern of applied 
systems analysis. In inter-disciplinary research approaches, economists, engineers,  
natural  and  social scientists have developed complex models to  assess systems' 
behavior in the  future. Influenced by the  technical na tu re  of systems analysis, 
uncertaint ies  in a model and its predictions have primarily been understood as  a 
function of t h e  quality of the  model design. Deviations observed between forecasts 
and actual developments have thus been considered a s  a property of the model. 
Although over t h e  past  decade howledge  of systems has  been increasing and 
forecasting techniques have been improved, this progress was not  always reflected 
in a higher forecast accuracy. Deviations often resul ted from important changes in 
the  exogenous environment of the forecasting model: these have been more pro- 
nounced in t h e  past decade than in previous periods. As a response to mounting 
exogenous uncertaint ies  the  scenario technique has  been developed. This tech-  
nique has  sometimes been interpreted as a means of immunizing the  modeler from 
criticism, as  with an increasing number of exogenous variables the  responsibility 
for the forecast 's  accuracy could be assigned to the  forecast environment. 
It is the  intention of the present paper to  contr ibute to  this  discussion by 
abstracting from the more technical understanding of energy forecasting and  look- 
ing upon basic s t ructural  features of any forecast. 
The resul ts  presented here a re  part  of a doctoral dissertation and were con- 
ducted during a fellowship a t  IIASA in 1983. The author  would like to  thank t h e  
Energy Group for their  warm support. The fellowship was generously sponsored by 
t h e  Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach Foundation, Essen, F.R.G. Very valuable 
aid and comments were also provided by Dr. E. Jochem (Fraunhofer-Institut fiir Sys- 
temtechnik u n d  Jnnovationsforschung, Karlsruhe, F.R.G.), Dr. M. Harter  
(Gemeinsame Forschungsstelle der Europaischen Gemeinschaften, Karlsruhe, 
F.R.G.). and E. Fulda (Institut fur  Philosophie, Universitat Karlsruhe. F.R.G.). The 
author would be grateful for any comments and criticism on the  paper which may be 
addressed to: Michael Kraus, International Energy AgencyIOECD, 2, rue Andre- 
Pascal, F-75775 Paris Cedex 16, France. 
Abstract 
Starting off with the historical development of energy forecasting, Chapter 1 
describes the emergence of conditional prognosis - so-called if-then s ta tements  - 
from an  increasingly politicized energy environment. Inherent  limits of energy 
demand forecasts a r e  shown a s  stemming from basic s t ructural  differences between 
economic and social sciences and na tura l  sciences. The scenario approach is dis- 
cussed in grea te r  detail. To clarify t h e  various scenario terms a distinction is made 
between a narrower and  broader scenario concept.  The IIASA energy model of 1980 
is used as  an example t o  show specific character is t ics  of the scenario technique and  
t h e  problems arising during i ts  application. 
A general definition of prognosis is given a t  the  beginning of Chapter  2, based 
on t h e  deduction scheme of Hempel and  Oppenheim. Thereafter, t he  s t ruc tura l  
identity of explanation and prognosis is disussed. In response to  t h e  c u r r e n t  lack of 
universal laws in t he  economic and social sciences, an attempt is made t o  develop a 
pragmatic understanding of forecasting laws. The extent  to which prognosis can 
ever  be founded is investigated through the example of the  "Miinchhausen- 
Trilemma". Two important  featurs  of prognosis a r e  analyzed, conditionality and  
reflexivity, and their  political implications a r e  discussed. Finally, t he  problem of 
forecast  evaluation is investigated and  methodological criteria for an evaluation a r e  
presented. 
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1. Introducing the Roblern 
The demand for fo recas t s  in t h e  field of energy economy is m e t  by various 
sides. P r iva te  firms, r e sea rch  ins t i tu tes  of t h e  economic and engineering 
sciences, adminis t ra t ive  authori t ies,  and supranational  organizations t r y  t o  
m a k e  fu tu re  developments transparent .  The methods pract iced thereby range 
from t h e  classic methods of t h e  economic sciences t o  t h e  newer sys tems  ana- 
lysis approaches of t h e  natura l  and engineering sciences. 
Along with t h e  increase in prognostic ac t iv i ty  over t h e  last decade substan- 
t ial  changes  have occurred in t h e  p rac t i ce  of forecasting. While until t h e  end 
of t h e  '60s a l t e rna t ive  variants of energy prognoses were  rareIy published, a s  
of approximately 1974 a l t e rna t ive  es t imates ,  so-called scenarios, began to b e  
published in order to document  t h e  precariousness of energy demand est ima- 
tion. 
The  switch to scenarios was part ly a react ion to progress which has been 
made in epistemology. A concious separa t ion of t h e  predictable from t h e  
u n p ~ . e d i ~ & l e . c a u s e d  thewithdrawal  from t h e  pract ice  of formulating predomi- 
nantly ca tegor ica l  forecasts .  Conditional prognoses, so-called if - t h e n  projec- 
tions, whose accuracy deoe  nds  explicitly on t h e  fulf i l lment of ce r t a in  postu- 
lations, now intend t o  emphasize  t h e  uncer ta in t ies  always present  in "scienti- 
fic" prognoses. "Scientific prognosis is distinguished from prophecy by i t s  con- 
ditionality" [ 1 ]. The  l imits  of prognostic efficiency w e r e  thus m a d e  more  
t r anspa ren t  for  t h e  prognosis user ,  but  s imultaneously t h e  informat ion  va lue  of 
t h e s e  f o r e c a s t s  diminished in compar ison  t o  t h e  a l leged  informational  va lue  
of a n  uncondit ional  (ca tegor ica l )  prognosis. 
However,  world and ene rgy  poli t ics ,  par t icu lar ly  both oil p r i ce  c r i s e s  in t h e  
'70s, w e r e  a l so  responsible for  t h e  e v e r  increasing use  of s cena r io  approaches.  
Due  to t h e  re la t ive ly  s t a b l e  fundamen ta l  condi t ions  in ene rgy  policy and  eco-  
nomics, unt i l  t h e  e a r l y  '70s a n  ene rgy  prognosis w a s  a planning ins t rument  fo r  
t h e  ene rgy  business and  gove rnmen t  au thor i t ies ,  in o rde r  t o  m e e t  t h e  e x p e c t e d  
energy  demand  wi th  a well-balanced energy  supply. D u e  t o  t h e  open  development  
of t h e  minera l  oil p r i ce  and  t h e  possible r eac t ion  of t h e  ene rgy  consumer ,  th is  
supply o r i en ted  ene rgy  policy needed t o  b e  replaced  by a m o r e  comprehens ive  
policy, which placed m o r e  emphas i s  on t h e  ra t ional  u se  of energy.  Administra-  
t o r s  had t o  widen the i r  concep t s  and measu res  to inc lude  t h e  demand  aspect ,  
in order  to r e a c t  su i tab ly  to t h e  a l t e r e d  fundamen ta l  condi t ions  wi th  a rat ion-  
a l  use  of ene rgy  and  minera l  oil subst i tutes .  This  c r e a t e d  new conf l i c t s  in t h e  
goals  of poli t ical  levels  as wel l  as subs tant ia l  unce r t a in ty  among  fo recas t e r s ,  
who  t r i ed  to c o m p e n s a t e  t h e  imponderabil i t ies  wi th  new approaches  of me thod  
(scenario: and  s imul ta t ion  techniques ,  s y s t e m s  analysis). In addit ion,  c l i m a t e  
and  envi ronment  f ac to r s ,  combined wi th  t h e  cons t an t ly  growing world ene rgy  
consumption,  increase  in poli t ical  impor tance .  
Together  wi th  t h e  tu rn  t o  i f- then s t a t e m e n t s  , t h e  danger  of a c e r t a i n  - 
des i red  - immuniza t ion  also rose  and  t h e  professionals w e r e  f a c e d  wi th  pub- 
l ic  c r i t ic i sm.  The  d e b a t e s  on nuclear  energy  and envi ronment  par t icu lar ly  
led t o  a demand  for  m o r e  t r anspa rency  when present ing  postulations, ca l -  
cu la t ions  and  e s t ima t ion  procedures  and  the i r  resul ts .  In consequence ,  a 
se r i e s  of new prognos t ica t ing  groups developed at  univers i t ies  and  o t h e r  in- 
s t i tu t ions ,  while  in a counter -movement  t h e  prognost ic  d e p a r t m e n t s  of  
f i r m s  and  t h e  t rad i t ional  ene rgy  Ins t i tu tes  improved the i r  ins t ruments  and  
emphas ized  t h e  condit ional i ty of t he i r  own prognoses. Thus ene rgy  prog- 
n o s e  w e r e  given t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of suggest ions f o r  ac t ion ,  for  which t h e  ad-  
d re s see  may o r  may no t  a g r e e  wi th  t h e  premisses. 
As a result ,  politicians and t h e  public a l ike  became  fu r the r  doubtful: "Possibly 
hidden values nourished a mist rus t  of potent ia l  consumers  in political prac t ice ,  
as well as t h e  col leagues  of t radi t ional  s c i en t i f i c  inst i tut ionsM/ 2 /. Instead of 
obtaining c l ea r  sc i en t i f i c  s t a t e m e n t s  about  t h e  fu ture ,  d iverse  prognostic  values 
accumula t ed .  T h e  span  a m o n g  t h e  prognos t ic  va r i an t s  a n d  t h e  prognos t ic  va lues  
of individual ins t i tu t ions  have  present ly  t aken  such  a n  e x t e n t ,  t h a t  t h e  appa-  
r e n t  i n fo rma t ive  va lue  of ene rgy  demand  e s t i m a t e s  h a s  been  reduced  substan-  
tially. 
1.1 T h e  l imi t s  of ene rgy  demand  e s t i m a t e s  
Up t o  t h e  p re sen t ,  c r i t i c i sm of ene rgy  demand  e s t i m a t e s  had been  based  o n  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  prognos t ic  va lues  dev ia t ed  f r o m  t h e  consumpt ion  ac tua l ly  observed.  
Although th i s  devia t ion  is ce r t a in ly  t h e  t a r g e t  var iab le  t o  b e  minimized,  i t  
should n o t  reverse ly  b e  t a k e n  fo r  a m e a s u r e  of prognosis '  qua l i ty  wi thout  fur -  
t h e r  considerat ion.  Most  of t h e  past  c r i t i ques  of ene rgy  d e m a n d  e s t i m a t e s  
w e r e  in e r r o r  by uncr i t ica l ly  t r ans fe r r ing  t o  ene rgy  prognosis t h e  compar ison  of 
t heo ry  wi th  empi r i ca l  f indings ( a  me thod  usually possible  in t h e  na tu ra l  scien-  
ces) ,  eg. a s t r i c t  compar ison  of t h e  predic ted  wi th  t h e  a c t u a l  ene rgy  consump- 
t ion  variables .  S u c h  p rocedure  mus t  e i t h e r  banish prognosis t o  t h e  r ea lm  of 
c o m p l e t e  i r ra t iona l i ty ,  because  ra t iona l ly  found devia t ions  of t h e  a c t u a l  va lue  
f rom t h e  prognos t ica ted  va lue  a r e  no t  recognizued,  or  t h e  prognosis is  only 
su f f i c i en t  f o r  a f e w  t r iv ia l  recommendat ions .  
Application or iented  prognoses'should not  be  measured  with t h e  s t anda rds  of 
c l a s s ~ c a l  na tu ra l  science.  T h e r e  r e m a i n  g r a v e  differences,  even  if t h e  econom- 
i c  and social  s c i ences  have  part ial ly adopted  t h e  analy t ica l  p rocedure  of t h e  
na tu ra l  sciences. Both sc i en t i f i c  disciplines start with  a simplif ied model  of re- 
a l i t y  by reducing i t  t o  a network of e f f e c t  re la t ionsh~ps .  But t h e  d e g r e e  of 
abs t r ac t ion  in na tu ra l  s c i ence  models  is general ly less t h a n  t h a t  of t h e  
economic  and socia l  sciences,  for  which ne i ther  t h e  fundamenta l  condit ions of 
t h e  ob jec t  under s tudy  c a n  b e  presumed cons tant ,  nor t h e  g r e a t  number of 
exis t ing  o r  expec ted  relat ionships b e  represented  by a model / 3 1. T h e  
success  enjoyed in physics in t h e  las t  t w o  cen tu r i e s  has  been  s o  g r e a t  because  
t h e  fundamenta l  condit ions of a n  inan ima te  sys t em c a n  be  r e p r o d u c e d  
relat ively simply flaboratory prognosis) and t h e  range of e f f e c t  relationships 
is relat ively ]in comparison to socio-economic systems. 
In t h e  energy sec to r  t h e  socially, economically and technically re levant  pro- 
plems overlap. The  "laws'1 of socio-economic and technical  sys tems can  
claim no s t r i c t  universal validity, but  a r e  understood r a t h e r  as l imited in 
t i m e  and s p a c e  and more  as quasi-causal relationships (for example  t h e  hy- 
pothesis which links energy consumption to economic growth). They canno t  
be  universally valid because t h e  presumptions and marginal  conditions, as 
well  as t h e  complex s t ruc tu res  underlying t h e  rough model c a n  never b e  ex- 
plicitly recorded completely.  They can  be  used, however, until they a r e  
questioned empirically: "Quasi theor ies  contain a n  essential  r e fe rence  t o  a 
part icular  spat ia l  and temporal  region, t h e  l imitat ion of their  application is 
d u e  to being thistorically' r e s t r i c t ed  t o  ce r t a in  objectst t  / 4 /. Thus, for ex- 
ample,  in t h e  ear ly  '70s t h e  majori ty of energy demand e s t i m a t e s  turned 
o u t  too high, because t h e  prognosticators ext rapola ted  relationships- and fun- 
damental  conditions which were  t r u e  for t h e  '60s, but  which no  longer ap- 
plied t o  t h e  '70s. The  regional variability becomes evident  in a n  internation- 
a l  comparison of t h e  energy economic development of countr ies  which c a n  
be  considered to have similarities. For example, t h e  comparison of t h e  
Federal  Republic of Germany with t h e  United Sta tes ,  being popular in t h e  
'60-s, and t h e  view i t  expressed, namely t h a t  t h e  development in t h e  USA 
leads t h e  way fo r  Germany at a cer ta in  distance,  could b e  proven only fo r  
part icular  sec to r s  ( t r a f f i c  development, t rend towards  a service  sector). 
T h e  p r o b  1 em of t h e  lack of knowledge about  relat ionships of e f f e c t  is 
intensified by a lack of knowledge about tk initial situation. Again, 
t h e  s tandards  of m w a l  sc ience  canno t  be applied. I t  is basically t r u e  fo r  
all sciences, t h a t  i t  is no t  feasible to make  measurements  o r  co l l ec t  d a t a  
without a n  underlying theory.  "The theory supplies t h e  instructions for  
measuring t h e  phenomenon. This is a m a t t e r  of course  in physics, but st i l l  
not  t h e  case in t h e  economic sc iences  and even less so in sociology, 
where  theor ies  aE s t i l l  predominantly speculative" / 5 /. This has reper-  
cussions on prognosis, which canno t  b e  b e t t e r  than t h e  description and 
analysis of t h e  pas t  development of t h e  object  under study and t h e  f a c t o r s  
of influence o r  their  present  state (diagnosis). 
T o  p r e d i c t  t h e  e n e r g y  c o n s u m p t i o n  i n  individual sectors  t he  fore- 
cas ter  for example, requires quant i ta t ive  d a t a  concerning individual techni- 
ca l  energy consumers, such as industrial equipment and machines o r  house- 
hold appliances. But this information problem could still not b e  solved, even 
if empirical  da t a  were  available; t h e  question would remain concerning t h e  
reliability and representativeness of these  data. Even if t h e  d a t a  were  satis- 
factory in these  terms,  i t  would st i l l  remain open, which influences should be  
removed. 
For example, t h e  general state of business influences t h e  ex ten t  t o  which 
capacit ies a r e  utililzed and thus indirectly influences t h e  energy consumption 
of many brancksof  industry, or t h e  c l imate  influences t h e  demand for room 
heatlrg i n  private households per temperature ,  precipitation and wind. The 
analyst can  reduce or e l iminate  par t  of these  inadequacies by removing d a t a  
appropriately. Nevertheless, substantial uncertainty remalns as t o  whether 
t h e  da ta  employed represent t he  initial situation sufficiently / 6 1. 
1.2 The scenario approach 
With t h e  turn from categorical  prognosis t o  conditional prognosis in t h e  '70s 
t h e  formally identified hypothetical charac te r  of predictions increased at the 
expense of practi~al usefulness. This finally led t o  a "new method" of anticipa- 
t ing t he  fu tu re  called'kcenario technique1'/ 7 /. I t  is less a new method than 
a more concious methodical handling of problems concerning t h e  provability 
and t h e  conditionality of prognoses 
The original notion of scenario developed by Kahn and Wiener comprised t he  
description of one or more hypothetical chains of events, which resulted 
from t h e  following questions: 
- How does a hypothetical si tuation cam about, s t ep  by s t e p  (rational prova- 
bility)? 
- Which al ternat ives  are possible at each s t age  for each  participant,  w i f i  
which he  can  prevent t h e  fur ther  process or guide i t  in another direction 
(conditionality)? 
Along with giving t h e  fu tu re  development of t h e  study object  i t  is t h e  aim of 
scenario techniques t o  e x p l i c i t l ~ s t a t e  t h e  assumptions of an  interrupted re- 
gressus ad infinitum. "Besides t h e  be t t e r  understanding of forecasting t h e r e  
a r e  new aspects  for dealing with problems, particularly be t t e r  conceptions of 
t h e  margin in which t h e  values of in teres t  can  plausibly develop "18  1. 
A very broad concept  of "scenario" led t o  a diffuse s t a t e  of t e r m s  in t h e  dis- 
cussion on prognosis. Misunderstanding and errors  occur especially when scen- 
arios a r e  taken for conventional prognoses or when prognoses a r e  labeled 
scenarios as uncertainties become evident. 
To clarify t h e  term,  in t h e  following we shall distinquish a n a r r o w r  from a 
broader scenario term. Both have in common t h a t  their  result  depends on t h e  
explicit assumption of part icular fu tu re  developments, similarly t o  conven- 
tional prognosis. However, not t h e  most probable suppositions a r e  assumed, 
but r a the r  postulation conditions a r e  varied independently of their  
probability, in order t o  observe t h e  e f f e c t s  these  have on t h e  results. 
There  is no unanimity among forecasters  on t h e  question of which conditions 
should be  varied most meaningfully. The narrower concept  of scenario allows 
solely variations of suppostition constellat ions - which must also satisfy plauSi- 
bility and consistency controls - in t h e  range of exogenous fac to rs  of in- 
fluence. Ho?wever, in t h e  ac tua l  a r e a  of study, for example  energy, as al- 
ways, only exclusively empirically proven relationships may be  used. Thus 
this is a conventional prognosis technique, in which however t h e  values of ex- 
ogemus variables are combined t o  very di f ferent  conceivable bundles of pre- 
sumptions. It is fu ther  of methodical  importance, t h a t  t h e  very s t r i c t  defini- 
tion of scenario is generally founded on qualitative-intuitive a r g u m e n s  
for t h e  exogenous environs and/or employs prognosis results  f rom other  dis- 
ciplines and institutions (such as prognoses on economic growth o r  t h e  availa- 
bility of mineral oil), but  usesquanti tat ive formal  methods in t h e  main a r e a  
of study (Fig. 1.1). 
The  broad concept of scenar io  not only begins with t h e  variat ion of exogen- 
ous secondary conditions, but also varies t h e  conditions of t h e  ob jec t  under 
study with quali tat ive-argumentative methods. Usually these  a r e  less 
complicated, but difficult,  if not  impossible, for third par t ies  t o  under- 
stand.. 
Exogenous suppositions 
b. 
Resul ts  
t qualitative-for ma1 methods  
Fig. 1.1 Description of t h e  scenar io  method 
Finally, in accord with Kahn and Wiener's second question, t h e  resul ts  c a n  
b e  normatively defined by desirable conceptions. In th is  case t h e  problem is 
not  to find t o  which resul ts  speci f ic  constel lat ions of suppositions may lead, 
but reversely, which presumed values will lead to speci f ic  goals. S tar t ing 
with any moment  in t h e  future. t h e  examination is done s t e p  by s t e p  back 
to t h e  present  to see if and how t h e  given goal c a n  b e  achieved. In th is  
case t h e  scenar io  has  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of a technological prognosis. Not t h e  an- 
t ic ipated f u t u r e  development is sought, but instead t h e  constel lat ion of exo- 
g e n ' a  variables which politicians, for  example, must  f i rs t  c r e a t e ,  in 
order to achieve a part icular  goal / 9 /. 
One example  fo r  th is  t y p e  of policy scenar io  is t h e  Energy Model of t h e  In- 
ternat ional  Ins t i tu te  fo r  Systems Analysis (IW 1401, whose structural make- 
up is shown in Fi5ur-e 1.2. 
But also energy studies which c la im t o  offer  a n  a l t e rna t ive  to conventional  
methods of observation and demons t ra te  "soft energy paths" a r e  part ial ly 
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founded on th is  so-called "backcastingN/l 1,121. Backcasting projections though 
have t h e  s a m e  difficult ies as forwards oriented prognoses, because relation- 
ships must b e  described for which t h e  conditions and network complexity a r e  
unknown and a r e  handled with simplifying hypotheses, quasi laws or  empirical  
generalizations such as t rend extrapolations. 
Independent of t h e  question, whether scenarios a r e  only m n c e r n e d  with t h e  
environs in which t h e  ac tua l  even t s  of t h e  energy sector  occur, or whether 
they include t h e  fundament, they  do not spare  t h e  trouble t o  give reasons for 
t h e  d a t a  used and t h e  formal  relationships involved. Thus they introduce 
difficult ies into t h e  prognosis which should not  b e  underestimated,  because 
they concern a n  e n t i r e  bundle of values and dependencies, although in addi - 
t ion t h e  demand for  consistency among, al l  in terdependencies  requires  fulfill- 
ment. This canno t  b e  fulfilled, because  i t  would i q i y  t h e  comple te  endogene- 
zation of al l  observed values. The theoret ica l  pretension and t h e  pract ica l  in- 
tent ion linked with t h e  concep t  of scenar io  technique thus  do  no t  lessen t h e  
ac tua l  problems of prognosis / 131. 
In t h e  most unfavorable case - which w e  usually have in t h e  energy s e c t o r  - 
t h e  resul ts  a r e  so sensi t ive  t o  t h e  assumed variables, t h a t  severa l  scenarios 
placed s ide  by s ide  show nothing more  than  t h e  spect rum of possible develop- 
ment  paths. And f o r  these  i t  nevertheless remains  unclear,  which a r e  t h e  un- 
ce r t a in t i e s  of t h e  various developments, when no  s t a t e m e n t  is made with 
respec t  t o  probability. This is  occasionally used as a n  a rgument  f o r  t h e  prac- 
t ica l  worthlessness of scenarios, because t h e  r e su l t s  pass  on t h e  major  ~ r o h l e m  
and  c a n  appa ren t ly  a l so  produce  a r b i t r a r y  r e su l t s  191. 
This judgment at most  applies - if i t  does not  implicitly suppress t h e  dilem- 
m a  of t h e  prediction's l imitat ions - to a n  understanding of scenar io  which ope- 
r a t e s  exclusively with quali tat ive-intuit ive methods (see above). However, i t  
ent i re ly  fa i l s  t o  recognize  t h e  implications of a complex topic  such as energy 
consumption, in which problems of social, economical  and technical  re levance 
overlap. 
Thus t h e  g r e a t  degree  of complexity of energy models found in t h e  backcast- 
ing approach does not  allow t h e  d i rec t  calculat ion of t h e  normatively deter-  
mined fu tu re  values to thus  compat ib le  scenarios. The  compatibil i ty of t h e  
base scenario's pa ramete r s  (which to begin with def ine  t h e  essential  impac t  
factors,  which actual ly  must  y e t  b e  found in t h e  f o r m  of consistent  scenarios)  
with t h e  normatively determined t a r g e t  variables must  b e  examined (compare  
Figure  1.3). 
Compatibil i ty is  usually not  given at t h e  beginning of model calculat ion,  so 
t h a t  in a fu r the r  ser ies  of model runs  t h e  exogen.ous scenar io  pa ramete r s  a r e  
varied repeatedly  unti l  a re la t ive  model stabil i ty is achieved with respec t  to 
important  f a c t o r s  of impac t  ( ze ro  order  results). These  provisional resul ts  
must then be  examined in t e r m s  of their  technical  and economic plausibility, 
the i r  social  execut ion(acrzptance  of nuclear energy) and thei r  political desir- 
ableness (dependence on c r u d e  oil). In succeeding i t e r a t i v e  model runs  no t  
only fur ther  (exogenous) scenario and (endogenous) model parameters,  
but also t h e  t a r g e t  variables a r e  varied, in order t o  finally obtain consis- 
t e n t  result  scenarios. 
The problem of this i t e ra t ive  procedure is demonstra ted by t h e  following 
n 
e lementary  calculation. x di f ferent  constellat ions c a n  be arranged for  n 
exogenous scenario (or t a rge t )  variables with x a l t e rna t ive  values each. 
With only t w o  a l t e rna t ive  values (such as high and low) and 15 exogenous 
variables t h e r e  are 32,768 possible a l t e rna t ive  variants. For practi- 
c a l  reasons i t  is absolutely necessary to achieve s tab le  provisional solu- 
tions which reduce th is  multi tude of a l ternat ives  t o  a s ize  which can  be  
easily handled. Such provisional solutions, which must a lso  sa t is fy  a large  
number of technical, economic and political r es t r  i ctions, c a n  cer ta inly  
not be  found with formal  mathemat ical  methods. They a r e  t h e  result  of 
vast  experience with energy models and t h e  e n e r g y  f i e ld .  - Hereto  w e  
should mention a fu r the r  aspect  of models, which has recent ly  gained in- 
creased attention: "the computer  as mediator" 114 /. 
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2. Introduction to the Problems of Prognosis 
2.1 The definition of prognosis 
The sc ient i f ic  discussion of prognostics is by no means complete;  t h e r e  st i l l  
lacks a sufficiently explained, generally accepted definition of prognosis. 
The prerequisi te for  a sat is factory  analysis of prognosis however, is a suf- 
f iciently c lea r  definition of prognosis, which would render possible t h e  for- 
mulation of adequate  evaluation c r i t e r i a  for prognoses. 
A narrow, initial, operable definition of " s i e n t i f i c  prognosis" was given by 
Hempel and Oppenheim (1948). I t  claims t h a t  a scient i f ic  prognosis exis ts  
when t h e  occurrence (or existence) of a single even t  is derived with t h e  aid 
of a law (nomological hypothesis) or laws and through a logical deductive 
conclusion. Logical deductive means a truth-conserving deduction, in which 
no information is given which exceeds  t h e  information s t a t e d  in t h e  premis- 
ses. The prognosis process can be described schematically in Figure 2.1. 
4 = Al,  A2, A3, ..., Am Initial and boundary res t r ic t ions  (antecedent  
restr ict ions 
G_ = G1, G2, G3, ..., Gn General  restsrict ions ( theoret ica l  laws) 
P Prognosis (explanation) 
- 
Fig. 2.1 Deduction schema of Hempel and Oppenheim 
The  prognosis P is t h e  resul t  of t h e  logical deduction f rom Al,  A2, ... A and 
m 
GI," GZ, ..., Gn. The symbols A and P each  represent  s t a tements  which describe 
single events  (singular s ta tements) ,  G represents  a Reneral (or generalizing) 
s ta tement .  The minimal requirement of t h e  hypotheses and postulation sy- 
s t e m  ist t h a t  of being f r e e  of contradiction and logically sufficient  for  t h e  
desired results  / 15 I. 
A closer look at t h e  e lements  of th is  definition is advisable. The  laws 
named above (nomological hypotheses) are s ta tements ,  whose validity - ac- 
cording t o  their  formulation - is not limited t o  a cer ta in  realm of t i m e  and 
space  i n  a n y  respect. Albert  coins these  "always-and-everywhere-if-then- 
s ta tements"  and thus  also part icularly emphasizes thei r  universal cha rac te r ,  a- 
long with the i r  conditional n a t u r e  116 /. Such "all ' l-statements include above al l  
t h e  laws of nature ,  f o r  example  Newton's law of gravity; but  also various 
s t a t e m e n t s  f rom t h e  social  sc iences  are of ten  considered t o  b e  universal hy- 
potheses, viz. t h e  hypotheses of learning theory,  behavior research o r  t h e  "law" 
of supply and demand in economics / 17 /. 
Universal s t a t e m e n t s  assert cer ta in  s t ruc tu ra l  invariances in t h e  even t s  of na- 
ture ,  which should b e  v a  l i d a t  all  t i m e s  in al l  places. This c la im simultan- 
eously implies however, t h a t  such a s t a t e m e n t  - if no  addit ional  assump tions 
a r e  made,- says  nothing abou t  t h e  ex i s t ence  of individual f ac t s ,  as Eucken per- 
t inently formulated:  " I t  conta ins  no judgments about  t h e  occur rence  of ce r t a in  
facts at c e r t a i n  places at cer ta in  times. I t  does no t  answer  t h e  question of 
when and where. I t  describes nothing" / 181. 
In contras t ,  t h e  singular s t a t e m e n t s  - A mentioned above a s s e r t  t h e  ex i s t ence  of 
ce r t a in  condit ions with a well-defined r e f e r e n c e  to place  and t ime. Such spa- 
t ial ly and temporally l imited s t a t e m e n t s  for  t h e  ex i s t ence  of f a c t s  a r e  of a 
purely descriptive c h a r a c t e r  and are also called "there-is-statements". In prog- 
nosis they mean t h a t  at  a par t icular  t i m e  at a part icular  p lace  condit ions be- 
c o m e  actual ,  s o  t h a t  combined with t h e  universal laws, in consequence a par- 
t i cu la r : s ing le~ .even t  - P will occur  (forecasts). The technological  a spec t  of laws 
l ies in t h e  f a c t  t h a t  they  c a n  b e  usedoby c rea t ing  ce r t a in  condi t ions  to induce 
their  e f f e c t s  (for t h e  t e r m  "technological prognosisa-see 119 1). 
2.2 St ructura l  identi ty of explanation:  and, prognosis 
The deduction schema of Hempel and Oppenheim demands t h a t  t h e  explana- 
t ion  supply single t e s t a b l e  s t a t e m e n t s  abou t  a p a r t  of rea l i ty  (see  Fig. 2.1). 
I t  is  no t  s t a t ed ,  whether  th is  is  a f u t u r e  or present  reality; t h e  t i m e  a s p e c t  
is apparent ly  of no importance.  We tac i t ly  assume, t h a t  t h e  explanation re- 
f e r s  t o  a f u t u r e  point in t i m e  and thus  gives a prognosis which overcomes 
t i m e  and s p a c e  (successive prognosis). This is no t  binding, however, because  
t h e  prognostic s t a t e m e n t  c a n  actual ly  r e fe r  t o  a y e t  unobserved p a r t  of t h e  
present ,  which remained unknown because  t h e  condit ions required t o  recog- 
n ize  i t  w e r e  insufficient  (coexis tence  prognosis). 
Independent of whether  t h e  t i m e  at which a prognosis was  produced l ies 
be fo re  o r  a f t e r  t h e  o c c u r r e n c e  of t h e  explanatory  e v e n t ,  w e  must  also dis- 
tinguish be tween  a n  e x  a n t e  prognosis (overcoming t i m e  and space)  and  a n  
e x  post  prognosis (for t h e  d i f ferent ia t ion of p ragmat ic  and ontological  t i m e  
re la t ions  see / 201). 
T o  produce prognoses and supply explanations,  as well as to produce and 
test general  hypotheses needed thereby,  is considered to b e  t h e  mos t  impor- 
t a n t  t a sk  of pract ica l  sc ien t i f i c  ac t iv i ty .  This is t h e  purpose of 
- t h e  logical conclusion f r o m  pas t  e v e n t s  and general  (law) hypotheses  to fu- 
t u r e  e v e n t s  of sc ien t i f i c  f o r e c a s t s  (ex  a n t e  prognosis) , and  
- t h e  logical conclusion f r o m  a n t e c e d e n t  even t s  and general  (law) hypotheses  
to a l ready  known e v e n t s  of explanation,  and  eventual ly  a l so  t h e  hypotheses  
test. 
Several  sc ien t i s t s  in te rp re t  th i s  to mean t h a t  t h e r e  is no  logical s t r u c t u r a l  
d i f f e r e n c e  be tween  explanat ion and prognosis. For m o r e  t h a n  t h i r t y  y e a r s  
t h e  question of t h e  logical s t r u c t u r a l  ident i ty  of explanat ion and prognosis 
has  been discussed wi th  varying intensity. Par t icular ly  Hempel  1 and 
Popper  1 11 a r e  of t h e  opinion t h a t  for  e a c h  (successful) explanat ion t h e r e  
is a prognosis wi th  t h e  s a m e  logical s t r u c t u r e  and v i c e  versa'..This means: 
"The d i f f e r e n c e  is not  o n e  of logical s t ruc tu re ,  but r a t h e r  o n e  of emphasis;  i t  
depends on what  w e  consider t o  be  our problem and what w e  d o  not so  consi- 
der. If i t  is not our problem t o  find a prognosis, while w e  t a k e  i t  t o  be  our 
problem t o  f ind t h e  ini t ial  condit ions or some  of t h e  universal laws (or both) 
f rom which w e  may deduce  a given "prognosis", then  w e  a r e  looking for  a n  
explanation ... . If w e  consider t h e  laws and initial condit ions a s  given ( ra ther  
than a s  t o  b e  found) and use them merely  f o r  deducing t h e  prognosis, in 
o rde r  t o  g e t  thereby s o m e  new information,  then w e  a r e  trying t o  make a 
predict ion" 111. 
In th i s  concep t  sc ien t i f i c  explanat ion thus  possesses t h e  s a m e  logical s t ruc-  
t u r e  as prognosis and  is dist inguishable solely in t e r m s  of t h e  p ragmat ic  
t empora l  c i rcumstances ;  namely no t  when t h e  problem is given and t h e  ex- 
planation sought, but reverse ly ,  t h e  problem is sought and  t h e  explanat ion 
given (cf .  Fig. 2.2). 
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This opinion has not  remained uncontradicted,  however. S ta r t ing  with t h e  
assumption t h a t  i t  is  principally possible t o  give ra t ional  reasons (not neces- 
sarily just explanations a s  for Hempel and Oppenheim), t h e  cr i t ic ism of t h e  
s t ruc tu ra l  ident i ty  thesis  begins with t h e  question of t h e  n a t u r e  which such 
reasons must  have, in order t o  b e  allowed in t h e  development of a ra t ional  
prognosis. Previously i t  was implicitly derived f rom t h e  Hempel-Oppenheim 
deduction schema, t h a t  exclusively so-called reasons of r ea l i ty  o r  being 
could supply a s turdy foundation for  prognoses which assume a cause  fo r  a n  
even t  / 20 1. 
The opponents of these  theses  however, also view fo rms  of reasons for  progno- 
ses as exis tent  and accep tab le  - so-called arguments  of reason o r  belief - 
which would not  b e  sufficient  fo r  a n  explanation as Hempel and Oppen - 
heim def ine  it. Arguments of reason - although they  d o  n o t  make  a n  ade- 
q u a t e  explanation possible - are sufficient  as arguments  of ra t ional  progno- 
sis, which means  t h a t  ra t ional  prognoses are possible on t h e  grounds of 
m e r e  convincing arguments  / 201. For example,  t h e  economic forecas t ing 
with t h e  indicative method of "Harvardts Barometer" turned o u t  to b e  trust-  
worthy, without having t h e  power of explanation / 22 /. A reverse  example  
isDarwin's theory of evolution, which explains t h e  selection and variat iqn of 
t h e  species, but canno t  predict  them. Thus w e  must a t  leas t  distinquish 
between (structurally identical)  prognoses f o r t h e  purpose of study (reasons 
of being) and prognoses as decision-making aids (arguments  of reason). A- 
long wi th  Kut tner  122.4' w e  should n o t e  t h e  d i f fe ren t  c i r cumstance  
of t h e  ex i s t ence  of test arguments  which confront prognosis and explana- 
t ion in t h e  s a m e  manner. The general  (law) hypotheses a r e  given and appro- 
p r i a t e  singular even t s  a r e  sought for t h e  an tecedence  as well  as t h e  conse- 
quence. This enables  a new order of explanation, prognosis and (indepen- 
dent)  t e s t ing  as follows (Fig. 2.3): 
Prognosis Explanation - Test  
given are A P G 
sought are P, G 
As long as theories of sc ience  cannot  d i f fe ren t i a t e  with sufficient  precision 
between universal (natural)  laws and other  law-like s t a t ements ,  t h e  thesis  
of symmetr ica l  s t ruc tu res  can  b e  advocated at t h e  most  as a normat ive  
challenge. The result ing liberalization, however, m e e t s  t h e  needs  of t h e  
empirical  sciences. 
2.3 A pract ica l  understanding of forecasting laws 
The science-theoretical  conception described above only lends t h e  predi- 
c a t e  "scientific" t o  prognoses which fulfill  t h e  requirements  of t h e  Hem- 
pel-Oppenheim deduction schema. Thus t h e  question of t h e  sc ient i f ic  na- 
t u r e  of a prognosis is ac tual ly  reduced t o  t h e  fulf i l lment of t h e  require- 
men t  of spatial- temporal  invariance of t h e  underlying law (nomological hy- 
pothesis). With t h e  except ion of some  limiting examples, t h e  tradit ional  
view is t h a t  natura l  laws sa t is fy  these  requirements.  But th is  is  usually 
no t  t h e  case for t h e  "law-barren" social  sc iences  anyway. 
Theoretically, a n  except ion is planning theory, in which t h e  planner him- 
self defines t h e  f u t u r e  values and tends t o  thei r  achievement  (technologi- 
cal  prognosis). 'This claim canno t  be supported by pract ica l  work, however, 
because single individuals remain a substantial  f ac to r  ,.of uncertainty in 
thei r  roles a s  performers  and consumers. P a s t  exper ience  shows t h a t  a n  in- 
c r e a s e  in living s tandards  is accompanied by a n  increase  in t h e  importance  
of t h e  "incalculable consumer" 1231. In a highly developed planned econ- 
omy t h e  requirements  for prognosis a r e  thus  not  much m o r e  favorable 
than in a marke t  economy / 241. If taken s t r ic t ly ,  a ca tegor ica l  demand 
of t h e  prerequisi tes and conditions mentioned above would have had t h e  
consequence t h a t  even today no one  could have spoken of sc ient i f ic  
prognosis in t h e  social  sec to r /  3 1. 
The cur ren t  d e f i c i t  on theory in this  sec to r  fo rces  t h e  use  of law-like hy- 
p o t h e s e  , whose linguistic formulation itself a l ready re fe r s  t o  individuals, 
part icular  epochs or even only t o  empirical  generalizations ( t rends)  122 /. 
such general  hypotheses with limited spatial  and temporal  validity a r e  
called quasi laws (for example  t h e  so-called linked hypothesis of energy 
consumption and economic growth in t h e  energy sector) .  
Of course, they have no claim to universal validity, but  should neverthe- 
less be used until they  a r e  empirically questionable: "Quasi theor ies  con- 
ta in  a n  essential  r e f e r e n c e  t o  a part icular  spatial  and temporal  region, t h e  
l imitat ion of their  application is due  t o  being 'historically' res t r ic ted  to 
cer ta in  objects" / 4 /. The  res t r ic t ion of quasi theor ies  and quasi laws t o  
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t o  c e r t a i n  epochs  and  regions, however, i s  a fo rma l  logic ques t ion  of essen- 
t ia l ly  gene ra l  s t a t emen t s .  
In f a c e  of t h e  c u r r e n t  lack of universal laws in t h e  economic  and  social  sci- 
e n c e s  t h e  impor tance  of theHemple-Oppenheim defini t ion is reduced t o  a 
des i rable  guiding s tandard ,  whose ideal  ru les  must  ac tua l ly  b e  broken and  re-  
placed by a reduced prerequis i te  level. This canno t  occur  wi thout  repercus-  
s ions on  t h e  sc i en t i f i c  self-understanding of prognostics. Limi ted  by pure  sci- 
e n c e  on  t h e  one  s ide  and specula t ion  on  t h e  o ther ,  prognostics is local ized 
in t h e  r ea lm of "not-yet-science" /25 /. I t  is a t r a d e  o r  technology,  which 
coun t s  as o n e  of t h e  appl ica t ions  of sc ience ,  but  does  not  belong t o  i t s  es- 
sence: "If forecas t ing  techniques  a r e  successful,  t h a t  is o n e  f a c t  m o r e  which 
scientists must  and perhaps  c a n  explain" / 2 6 / .  
2.4 C a n  prognoses b e  founded? 
Chap te r s  2.1 and 2.2 have  shown t h a t  s c i en t i f i c  prognosis is distinguishable 
f rom prophecy by being founded ra t ional ly  and methodically. Par t icular ly  
when t h e  prognosis' reasons  include genera l  laws (hypotheses), t h e  e x i s t e n c e  
of r e s t r i c t ions  concerning the i r  applicat ion must  in tu rn  b e  predic ted  for  
ca tegor ica l  prognoses. But th i s  is only possible when t h e  ex i s t ence  of indi- 
vidual r e s t r i c t ions  a r e  o n  the i r  p a r t  deduc ted  f rom laws and  new an tece -  
den t  restr ict ions.  S ince  t h e s e  in tu rn  a l so  part ial ly r e fe r  t o  things of t h e  fu-  
tu re ,  o n e  f inds himself conf ron ted  - in t h e  case of ca t egor i ca l  prognosis 
founded s t r i c t ly  nomologically- wi th  a n  infini te  prognostic  recourse.  "If w e  
demand just if icat ion by reasoned a rgument ,  in t h e  logical sense,  t h e n  w e  a r e  
c o m m i t t e d  t o  t h e  view t h a t  s t a t e m e n t s  c a n  be  justified only by s t a t e m e n t s .  
T h e  demand t h a t  - a l l  s t a t e m e n t s  a r e  t o  be  logically j u s t ~ f i e d  (...) is t he re fo re  
bound t o  lead t o  a n  inf in i te  regress" /27/. 
Concerning th i s  problem, Albert  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  so-called "Munchhausen Tri- 
lemma", s i n c e a r  s e a r c h  fo r  a conclusive reason al lows only t h e  cho ice  be- 
t ween: 
1. a n  infini te  recourse ,  which appea r s  t o  be given by t h e  need t o  find f i r s t  
reasons,  al though th i s  c a n  prac t ica l ly  not b e  achieved and thus  supplies no  
solid foundation,  
2. a logical c i r c l e  of deduct ion  in t h e  a rgument  process  caused  by using 
s t a t e m e n t s  which w e r e  a l r eady  used though lacking reasons. This  logically 
er roneous  c i r c l e  a l so  does  no t  supply a foundation. And finally, 
3. breaking of f  the  procedure at a particular point, which in principle 
seems practical,  but would involve suspending t h e  principle of sufficient 
argument arbitrarily / 28 /. 
Since in practical prognosis an infinite recourse is not feasible and a logi- 
cal c i rc le  is inacceptable, t h e  only choice remaining for s t r i c t  nomologi- 
cal prognoses is t o  break off t h e  procedure .  Of cou r se ,  t h e  inevit- 
able break-off a t  particular points of t he  prognoses' argumentation can  be  
considered t o  be temporary, but i t  is not possible t o  clearly distinguish i t  
from dogmatism. 
In t h e  discussion on energy f o r e c a s t i n g  t h e  break-off  point  h a s  not icebly  
s h i f t e d  in t h e  p a s t  years .  C r i t i c i s m  of t h e  s imp le  s loba l  r e l a t i onsh ip  b e t w e e n  
p r i m a r y  e n e r g y  consumpt ion  and t h e  gross  na t iona l  p roduc t  led  t o  a n  e x t e n -  
sion and differentiation of this linking hypothesis. The result was an  endo- 
geny of variables which were previously held for exogenous or which were 
not explained by the  theoret ical  approach. Such variables are ,  for exam- 
ple, t h e  ne t  production values of economic sectors,  t h e  actual  energy 
price level or t h e  relation of energy prices t o  t h e  prices of other produc- 
tion factors.  The endogeny of p~.eviousl~exogenous variables substantially 
improved t h e  s t rength of prognoses' s ta tements  / 9 /. Furthermore, various 
consumer sectors  were improved, for  example, private households with 
their stock of appliances for e lectr ic i ty  prognoses. 
The endogeny of previously exogenous variables and the  improvement of 
t h e  interwoven s t ruc ture  of  energy consumption sec tors  causes an  in- 
c rease  in t h e  number of t h e  model's elements and their relationships. 
This not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively increases t he  complex- 
ity of prognoses. New exogenous variables make i t  necessary t o  assume 
more theoretical relationships in t h e  model, which of ten lie in scientific 
fields lacking empirically secured theories / 291. In open systems - inclu- 
ding t h e  energy sector - i t  is impossible t o  achieve complete  endogeny. 
2.5 The conditionality of prognosis 
The pragmatic solution for t h e  conflict  of a ims  between rational and me- 
thodical argumentation on t h e  one hand (as shown in t h e  previous sec- 
tions 2.1 and 2.2) and t h e  complete  nomological argumentation on the  
other (prognostic infinite recourse (2.4)) can be found in t h e  definition of 
a "sufficiently" advanced break-off point in t h e  argument  process. This 
"degree to which a problem is solved", which means  t h e  conditionality of 
t h e  prognosis, c a n  be  drawn upon as a n  indicator of t h e  sc ient i f ic  na tu re  
of a prognosis. 
In common usage, a prognosis is a s t a t e m e n t  formulated with practically 
no restr ict ions.  In principle, fo recas t s  can  be of unconditional o r  condi- 
tional nature.  In t h e  second case they  a r e  also called if - then  
s t a t e m e n t s  / 301. The  question of whether a prognosis should be  formula- 
t e d  unconditionally or conditionally can  be handled depending on whether  
t h e  occurrence  of t h e  prerequisi tes c a n  b e  expected wi th  g r e a t  cer ta in-  
ty ,  or  whether  thei r  occur rence  is of a more hypothetical n a t u r e  126 /. 
In t h e  energy discussion conditional prognoses have been cal led  projec- 
t ions since t h e  ear ly  '70s, in order  t o  distinguish t h e m  from t h e  more  ca- 
tegorical  prognoses of t h e  '50s and '60s. (In contras t ,  Schanz, with re- 
f e rence  to Albert  131 /, def ines  projections as fo recas t s  lacking a n  expli- 
c i t  r e fe rence  t o  theoret ica l  regulari t ies,  while Vajna / 321 uses projec- 
t ions fo r  f u t u r e  developments as they  should occur according to political 
goals.) 
Unconditional, ca tegor ica l  prognoses contain s t a t e m e n t s  which c a n  be  
founded rationally o r  irrationally (for example: "Energy consumption will 
increase by x%!). Categor ica l  prognoses not  based on laws of succession 
make i t  necessary to additionally assume t h a t  ce r t a in  secondary condi- 
t ions  remain stable.  This is commonly expressed in t h e  fo rm of a predo- 
minantly unspecified c e t e r i s  paribus clause, s t a t ing  for  example,  t h a t  un- 
foreseen disturbances originating outside t h e  sys tem a r e  no t  considered, 
if t h e  sys tem is  not  closed and sufficiently isolated. Actually every  cate- 
gorical fo recas t  depends on hidden, assumed constants  and secondary con- 
ditions / 331. An explici t  explanation of these  assumptions is especial ly a- 
bandoned when t h e  prognosis user desires uncomplicated and binding 
s t a t e m e n t s  about  t h e  fu ture .  S t r i c t  assumptions of constants,  however, 
o f t en  coll ide with t h e  ac tua l  facts found in t h e  social sector.  
Thus only t h e  e x t e n t  t o  which t h e  conditions of t h e  assumptions c a n  b e  
investigated guarantees  t h a t  anyone - at leas t  any sc ient is t  in t h e  s a m e  
field - can understand t h e  a rguments  and evaluate  t h e  prognosis. For 
social problems - and th is  is particularly t r u e  for t h e  energy sector  - t h e  
lack of empirically secured theories creates t h e  need for additional 
theoret ica l  assumptions in t h e  model and thus makes t h e  s t a tements  con- 
siderably hypothetical / 3  /. Categorically formulated prognoses can 
thus only be  scientifically accounted for in exceptional cases, when all  
antecedent  conditions a r e  fulfilled and t h e  necessary laws a r e  known . 
T k s e  condit ions a r e  certainly not siven in t h e  energy sector.  
The second kind of fo recas t  mentioned at t h e  ou t se t  is a conditional 
prognosis (for example: "Energy consumption will increase by x%, if 
t h e  gross social product increases by y%!").It does justice t o  cropping 
uncertainties by disclosing i t s  premisses and guarantees  t h a t  i t  can  be 
understood. Only t h e  most complete  revelation of t h e  argument ' s  pre- 
misses will permit  an  adequa te  evaluation and cri t icism of t h e  prog- 
nosis. Thus conditionality is t h e  f i r s t  character is t ic  of a scientif ic prog- 
nosis as distinguished f rom pure speculation and prophecy. Part icularly 
in t h e  energy sector ,  prognoses claiming t o  be  sc ient i f ic  must keep 
their  d is tance f rom categorical  formulations. They must b e  much more  
careful  t o  discover and disclose t o  which e x t e n t  results  a r e  influenced 
by uncertainties in conclusion-making, insufficient d a t a  or  t h e  diff i cul- 
t i e s  in defining rea l  processes and mechanisms / 3 4  /. This also does jus- 
t i c e  t o  t h e  experience t h a t  many energy prognoses were  founded quite 
"correctly" and solely neglected t o  consider a secondary e f f e c t  suf- 
f iciently. 
Although t h e r e  is commonly assent, t h a t  scientifically serious 
prognoses must be  conditional, conditionality is limited by t h e  require- 
ment  of practical  application. A prognosis which c a n  b e  used must be 
conditional, but i t s  informative value is reduced by each  additional con- 
dition, so  t h a t  in a n  e x t r e m e  case i t  degenerates  t o  just a tautology: 
"Prognoses of energy economics cannot  usually g e t  by with o n e  secon- 
dary condition, they require several  asssumptions, b ut  when f i rs t  a 
combination of numerous assumptions must be  fulfilled t o  render t h e  
validity of a prognosis, t h e r e  is t h e  danger tha t ,  taken str ict ly,  t h e  
prognosis cannot be t e s t e d  and is thus irrefutable, because t h e  com- 
ple te  part icular  constel lat ion of assumptions will hardly e v e r  occur  /35 /. 
Some ref lec t ions  on method a lso  justify t h e  demand fo r  prognoses which 
a r e  only part ial ly conditional, to counter  protect ive  endeavors: "If t h e  
fo recas te r  is no t  held responsible for  t h e  predict ive evaluation of exogen- 
ous fac tors ,  h e  c a n  great ly  simplify his task  by drawing t h e  line adeptly,  
although th is  a lso  l imits  t h e  value  of t h e  s t a t e m e n t  to t h e  s a m e  degree: 
By shift ing t h e  burden of prognosis to t h e  exogenous variables o n e  c a n  
shirk responsibility for  f a l se  prognoses in a n  unseemly manner" /36 /. 
This objection is superfluous, however, when t h e  user of t h e  prognosis c a n  
influence t h e  given condit ions himself. 
The reciprocali ty of res t r ic tedness  and s t a t e m e n t  value  also brings politi- 
c a l  implications. As long as prognoses s e r v e  t h e  prepara t ion of decisions 
fo r  ac t ion  solely, a g r e a t  amount  of empir ica l  information is requisi te for  
thei r  pract ica l  application. As t h e  political re levance of these  decisions in- 
creases ,  however, th i s  a spec t  f ades  and is replaced by t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  of 
psychological motivational ef fec ts .  "Under conditions of sc ient i f ic  p l i t ics ,  
t h e  usefulness of analysis and prognoses fo r  politicians and adminis t ra tors  
c a n  b e  measured no t  only by thei r  contribution to t h e  development o r  
evaluation of political programs, but  a lso  by t h e  aid which they  o f fe r  in 
daily political business, in t h e  way in which they external ly  support  initia- 
tives, how they c a n  b e  "sold", and fo r  investigation and cr i t ic ism (possibly 
of t h e  political opponent's ini t iat ives which endanger one's  own position)" 
/ 2/. For th is  reason i t  c a n  be  considered a s t ra tegy ,  when poli- 
t ica l  groups defending ce r t a in  in teres ts  partially a t t e m p t  to formulate . .  
the i r  prognoses in such a way as to  be  irrefutable,  and a c c e p t  a loss of in- 
fo rmat ive  value. 
2.6 'The reflexivity of prognosis 
The  f a c t  t h a t  political implications can a lso  b e  linked t o  a prognostic 
s t a t e m e n t  draws a n  important  cha rac te r i s t i c  of prognoses to our a t t e n -  
tion: thei r  inherent  dynamics. Prognoses as decision-making a ids  a r e  in- 
s t ruct ions  for  ac t ion in p rac t i ce ,  and thus  they  e x e r t  a more o r  less 
s t rong influence on t h e  objects  with which they  a r e  concerned.  'This 
means tha t  forecasts in social systems a r e  social events themselves, 
which can induce reciprocal effects  with t h e  events covered by t h e  prog- 
nosis. Via decision rules and procedures t h e  prognosis has an effect on 
t h e  objects under study a t  a future  point of time. With reference t o  an 
ancient example, this phenomenon of reflexivity or inherent dynamics is 
also called t he  "Oedipus effect" 127 /. The prognostic effects  can be 
understood a s  feedback mechanisms, a s  shown in Figure 2.4 
Fig. 2. 4 Prognostic feedback 
Since the publication of Merton's classic essay (19481,two different forms 
of this phenomenon a re  distinguished: the self-fulfilling prophecy and the 
seif-destroying prophecy. In t he  first  case the prognosis itself contributes 
t o  t he  actual occurrence of the  event which i t  predicted. In the  second 
case,  the  prognostic s ta tement  causes a change in the object of progno- 
sis, s o  tha t  i t  refutes itself (see Fig. 2.5). 
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Since reflexivity is only of importance  in social  sec tors ,  t h e  argument  of 
self-refutal  is sporadically used to c la im t h a t  economic and social  scienti- 
f i c  prognosis is in principle impossible 1381. The majority, however, 
denies a t o t a l  agnosticism in t h e  prognostic discussion 'leven though w e  
must  admi t  t h a t  a n  ... informational  feedback makes  t h e  analysis more  
dif ficultl '  / j q  /. Badura even views t h e  reflexivity of prognosis as a poten- 
t ial  cause  of social  change. This means t h a t  "(according to t h e  self-under- 
standing of professional forecas ters)  prognosis can,  yes even  should r e f u t e  
itself o r  f i r s t  genera te  t h e  prerequisi tes necessary fo r  their  validity" 
/ 2 /. Attes lander  1371 assesses t h e  inherent  dynamics of  social  prognoses 
similarly. 
An object ive  control  of t h e  success  of prognostic achievements  canno t  
remain uneffected by th is  and in relationships arising in pract ica l  applica- 
t ion t h e  self-destroying power plays t h e  more  important  role. Since a pre- 
d ic ted  misdevelopment may b e  qu i t e  avoidable, political o r  business au- 
thor i t ies  could use such a prognosis as a reason for  (successful) counterac- 
t i v e  measures. For such a constel lat ion i t  would naturally make  no  sense 
to in te rp re t  t h e  absence of t h e  misdevelopment a s  a fa l se  prognosis. On 
t h e  o the r  hand, t h e  rea l i ty  of prognostic e f f e c t s  c a n  b e  misused as a n  ali- 
bi in order  t o  shield prognoses f rom errors,  whose actual  cause  lies in t h e  
imperfection of t h e  underlying assumptions and rules, by in turn  a t t r ibu-  
t ing unprovable prognostic e f f e c t s  t o  their  causes  /40 /. 
Meier /41/  shows empir ica l  proof of prognostic e f f e c t s  fo r  GNP and in- 
f lat ion fo r  t h e  USA, Switzerland and t h e  Federal  Republic of Germany. 
His resul ts  conf i rm t h e  influence which inflation prognoses have no t  only 
on inflation, but  on economic act iv i ty  as well. An influence of GNP prog- 
nosis on t h e  t h r e e  output  components consumption, investment and public 
expenditure and thus  on t h e  ac tual ized GNPdevelopment can  b e  proven at 
l eas t  for  t h e  USA. 
Many problems of inherent  dynamics have been discussed thoroughly, par- 
t icularly those  of t h e  self-destroying e f f e c t  re levant  in practice.  A uni- 
fo rm and sys temat ic  discussion on th is  topic  has y e t  t o  ensue, however, 
/43/ .  St ra teg ies  have been designed t o  e i the r  prevent  t h e  occurrence  of 
self-refutal ,  through keeping prognoses s e c r e t  o r  simulating them,  for  ex- 
ample  140 / , or t o  counter  t h e  self-destroying e f f e c t  by including t h e  
feedback e f f e c t s  in t h e  prognosis itself / 42 /. The  fundamental  possibility 
of th is  procedure (so-called x-rational prognosis / 41 /), is controversial.  
Morgenstern (1928) held t h e  opinion, t h a t  even in a case where  knowledge 
of t h e  quan t i t a t ive  relat ionship between t h e  publication and t h e  conse- 
quent  reaction allows consideration of feedback e f fec t s ,  t h e s e  effects c a n  
s t i l l  occur,  because  t h e  intention of t h e  prognosis c a n  b e  misunderstood 
and over run .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  hand, h e  did l a t e r  at l e a s t  t heo re t i ca l l y  provide  a 
way t o  e v a d e  scep t i c i sm of prognosis based on  feedback:  T o  s o m e  typica l  
r e f l ex ive  s i t ua t ions  h e  a p p l ~ e d  c o n c e p t s  of t h e  g a m e  theo ry  which h e  
developed wi th  John  von Neumann and  the reby  solved,  or a t  l e a s t  weakened  
t h e  "paradoxical"  s i t ua t ion  in a dec i s~on-o r i en t ed  c o n t e x t  152,531. 
In t h e  energy sec to r  i t  is diff icult  t o  prove reflexivity. The  cause-and- 
e f f e c t  relat ionships exist ing between energy prognoses and act ions  o r  
omissions canno t  b e  exposed d i s t~nc t ly .  This is d u e  to t h e  e x t r e m e  com-  
plexity of energy economic relationships. Here  reali ty-  a l ter ing measures  
a r e  a resul t  of decision-making processes of a large  number of deci- 
sion-makers with part ial ly con t ra ry  intentions, in addition. 
2.7 Problemat ics  of evaluation c r i t e r i a  
Prognoses intended as aids  in decision-making a r e  p a r t  of t h e  following 
causal  chain  (Fig- 2.--6): 
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In prognosis evaluation t w o  ent i re ly  d i f ferent  questions a r e  placed in t h e  
foreground, depending on whether  t h e  judgment is made  before  (ex a n t e )  
o r  a f t e r  (ex post)  t h e  occur rence  of t h e  predicted event.  Desired is e i the r  
a n  evaluation of t h e  quali ty of a prognosis (quality judgment) at t h e  t i m e  
i t  is made, or wi th  respec t  to t h e  development and application of progno- 
s t i c  methods, a judgment concerning t h e  efficiency of pas t  prognoses (suc- 
cess control)  / 431. 
The subject  of e x  post  evaluations is usually a comparison of t h e  pre- 
d ic ted  values with those  which actual ly  occured (B in Fig. 2 3 ,  o r  t h e  de- 
terminat ion of sui table  s t a t i s t i c  cha rac te r i s t i c  values. The  host of feas-  
ible prognostic definit ions is considerable: variat ion coeff ic ient ,  turning 
point errors,  Thei l t s  inequality coefficients,  cumulat ive  e r r o r s  of over- 
and underest imates,  etc. 145 /. 
A perusal of t h e  l i t e ra tu re  available on prognosis evaluation will show 
t h a t  t h e  numerical  definition of predict ion/actuali ty deviations c a n  hardly 
give a comple te  p ic tu re  of prognostic method efficiency. Weichhardt 
/ 461, for example,  draws t h e  conclusion t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o  "meone" absolute  
measure for  evaluat ing prognoses, and i t  is much m o r e  important  t o  mea- 
su re  e r ro r s  in line with t h e  part icular  question. But Vajna 132 / then  finds 
a n  object ive  prognosis evaluation questionable: "The informative value  of 
a n  analysis of accuracy  is largely exhausted a f t e r  ca lcula t ing t h e  devia- 
tions. The qual i ta t ive  conclusions drawn f rom t h e  degree  of e a c h  devia- 
t ion rely on  personal opinion." Numerically recording e r r o r s  has  proven to 
be  unsuitable for gaining a n  explanation of t h e  causes  for  prognostic mis- 
takes. 
The l imits  of t h e  mechanical  comparison of f o r e c a s t  to  rea l i ty  a r e  given 
fo r  several  reasons. When fo recas t s  a r e  predicted and compared to t h e  
values which actual ly  occur,  th is  can  be done for a single prognosis o r  
fo r  a n  e n t i r e  t i m e  series. In t h e  f i r s t  case, t h e  forecast-reali ty compari-  
son complete ly  ignores t h e  conditions under which t h e  t h e  prognosis ori- 
ginated; i.e. to which e x t e n t  deviations a r e  d u e  to fa l se  assumptions a t  
t h e  t i m e  of prediction (A in Fig. 2.5). Likewise, a "correct" resul t  could 
ac tual ly  have  originated in t h e  mutual  compensation of erroneous as- 
sumptions, which for  example  was  t h e  case with  t h e  energy report 196 1 
139 /. The supposed "equality" of resul ts  for  d i f ferent  prognoses must si- 
milarly b e  viewed critically: Congruous prognostic values c a n  or ig inate  
in completely different ,  even  contradic tory  constel lat ions of assump- 
tions. An example  is t h e  Mesarovic-Pestel world model and t h e  WAES 
study / 9 /. Furthermore ,  self-destroying e f f e c t s  c a n  occur  o r  t h e  prog- 
nostic values can  be  falsif ied by in teres ts  flowing into t h e  prognosis. 
In t h e  second case of t i m e  ser ies  analysis a distort ion of t h e  prognosis 
evaluation c a n  b e  c r e a t e d  by t h e  e x t e n t  of er ror ,  by eva lua t ing  a re- 
latively "easy" and a relat ively "difficult" object  of prognosis indiscrini-  
nate ly .  This is t r u e  fo r  both longitudinal sect ions  and cross  sect ions  
analysis. 'Thus t h e  prognosis' degree  of difficulty var ies  in t h e  energy 
sec to r  on t h e  o n e  hand with respect  to new and t radi t ional  energy ca r -  
r iers  (i.e. small  or  large  marke t  shares  / 47 /), on t h e  o the r  hand how- 
ever  a lso  in r espec t  to t h e  period of t i m e  covered by t h e  prognosis. In 
t h e  '60s, in con t ras t  to t h e  ' 7 0 s  i t  was comparably simple to set up 
rel iable e lec t r i c i ty  prognoses through t r end  extrapola t ions  / 481. 
The problems demonstra ted  demand new concepts  f o r  t h e  evaluation of 
prognoses. Since they  s e r v e  in t h e  quant i ta t ive  preparation of decisions 
made  to a t t a i n  c e r t a i n  goals, i t  appears  natura l  to use t h e  degree  of at- 
t a inment  a s  a measure  of prognostic success o r  fa i lure  (C in Fig. 2.5). 
"Assuming t h a t  t h e  fo recas t s  have been prepared fo r  some  decision pur- 
pose, w e  c a n  say t h a t  thei r  quali ty is determined by t h e  quality of t h e  
decision to which they  led" / 491. The  crucia l  point in t h e  problem of 
determining "prognostic success" thus  shi f ts  f rom t h e  question of prog- 
nosis quali ty to t h e  question of a n  erroneous pronosis' consequences. "A 
prognosis c a n  b e  considered c o r r e c t  a s  long a s  i t  provokes no wrong de- 
cisions, and i t  has  been fa l se  as soon as t h e  measures t aken  as a result  
of t h e  prognosis a f t e rwards  prove to have been unnecessary" / 321. This 
means t h a t  i t  is assumed t h a t  t h e  fo recas te r  s t r ives  to maximize  t h e  
usefulness in any way possible and le ts  quality b e  expressed in t e r m s  of 
t h e  cos t s  which would a r i se  through wrong decisions. Logical diff icult ies 
of interpretation can  occur here, however, for example in how t o  
evaluate prognostic success "if an erroneous prognosis is followed by 
'wrong decisions' which compensate each other so t h a t  no losses occur" 
132 /. 
including the prognosis consecutiveness in t he  evaluation of success- 
fulness is bound t o  b e  a failure for practical reasons. The main problem 
is t he  definition of a suitable usefulness-function and the  corresponding 
preference structures. An example demonstrating how difficult i t  is t o  
determine such a function particularly in the  energy sector is the  
so-called asymmetry hypothesis. Since energy- particularly t h e  energy 
carrier electrical current  - is a l im~ ta t ive  means of production in many 
industrial sectors, the  assumption is derived therefrom, t h a t  the  econo- 
mic costs of underestimating t h e  future  demand for  electricity should 
have a greater  priority (also through greater environmental pollution 
due t o  t he  further operation of old equipment) than the  costs of over- 
estimating, because i t  implies only isolated economic costs  of e l e t r  ici ty 
generating plants whose capacity is not fully exhausted 135 /. 
The evaluation of unequal e f fec t s  of prognostic deviations which a r e  nu- 
merically greater,  but governed by different aims, is a problem in it- 
self. The prd1e-n has become mote critical, however, by t h e  f a c t  tha t  
t he  asymmetry thesis has been partially falsified by empirical findings. 
Asher !50/  describes t he  effects  of an electricity supply shortage in 
the  mid-'60s in t he  USA as  follows: "To meet  the  unexpected demand, 
e lectr ic  utilities have had t o  make up for t he  lack of more efficient 
conventional fossil-fuel or nuclear power plants. Utilities turned t o  gas 
turbines because they could be  installed rapidly t o  aver t  the  immediate 
crisis, while t he  more efficient plants would have required much longer 
periods of planning, ligitation and construction." This means t ha t  t he  
use of gas turbines reducedenvironmental pollution instead of increas- 
ing it, and the  asssumed costs of nuclear plants not exhausted t o  their 
full capacity a r e  confronted with real  costs based on differences in 
technological efficiency. It is obviously not possible t o  define a gain or 
loss function for t he  complex energy sector. 
Having eliminated the  concept of prognostic consectutiveness, t h e  ques- 
tion is how t o  replace or supplement insufficient traditional compari- 
sons of predictions with reality. The weak point was t h e  inability to iden- 
t i fy  t h e  sources of errors. This is exact ly  t h e  point where t h e  applied 
proce dure begins / 5  1 /, which has not y e t  been used in comparable situa- 
tions. The impact  of assumptions and t h e  prognostic method employed by 
t h e  forecasters  is of part icular interest. The  main idea is t h a t  deviations 
in t h e  comparison of prognoses with real i ty  comprise assumptions and 
methodical  e r ro rs  (see Fig. 2.7). 
1) wi thout  re f lex iv i ty :  t r u e  s t a t e m e n t  
2) wi thout  e r r o r  compensat ions:  p r ed i c t ed / ac tua l  devia t ion  
Fig. 2.7 Prognosis  t r u t h  t a b l e  
If through e x  post analysis t h e  t r u e  development of t h e  assumed variables 
and t h e  "correct" prognostic method c a n  b e  found, answers will also be  
found for t h e  following hypothetical  questions: 
a) What would t h e  prognosis be, if - using t h e  s a m e  prognostic method - 
i t  were  based on t h e  c o r r e c t  assumtion values which w e r e  discovered e x  
post f a c t o ?  
b) What would t h e  prognosis be, if - using t h e  s a m e  prognostic assump- 
tions - t h e  "correct" prognostic method, discovered e x  post facto ,  were  
used? 
Prognosis  
assumpt ion  
(exegenous)  
* 
The comparison of e x  post prognosis values -(a)  with t h e  actual ly  pre- 
d ic ted prognostic values allows a different ia ted s t a t e m e n t  on t o  which ex- 
t e n t  t h e  mistakes of prognoses a r e  due t o  fa l se  assumptio.ns concerning 
t h e  development of t h e  fundamental  conditions. T h e  comparison of t h e  ex  
post prognoses (b) ult imately gives information about t h e  faul ts  of t h e  
causal  relationships and methods which have been employed. 
- 
(law-like) Hypotheses  
t r u e  
f a l s e  
Using au then t ic  sources, t h e  a t t e m p t  should be  made t o  reconst rue  t h e  
causal  relationships assumed by t h e  forecasters.  The  prognoses under 
t r u e  
t r u e  s t a t e m e n t  
assumpt ion  
e r r o r  
f a l s e  
me thod  e r r o r  
t o t a l  e r r o r  
study must have clear premisses and methods, however, and it must ! b e  
possible to follow the prognostic proceedure. In published prognoses this 
prerequisite has been fulfilled in very varying degrees, which has led to 
simplifications 15 11. 
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